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HOW MUCH PROTECTION DO INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF ALLEGEDLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES PROVIDE?
Vikram David Amar*
INTRODUCTION
The federal "Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003" ("the
Act") authorizes fines and/or jail terms of up to two years for any
doctor who performs a so-called "partial birth abortion"-a proce-
dure Congress tried to define in the Act itself.1 The Act also au-
thorizes civil damage actions against doctors who engage in the
prohibited conduct.2
Unsurprisingly, in the weeks following the Act's passage, a num-
ber of federal district courts issued temporary restraining orders
("TROs") and preliminary injunctions that prohibited, at least for
the time being, the Justice Department from enforcing the new
law. The restraining orders were issued by the district courts in
large part because of the very significant possibility that the Act,
when carefully and fully considered by courts on the merits, will
end up being invalidated as unconstitutional.4
As other contributors to this Issue are explaining in much more
detail, the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of
Pennsylvania v. Casey5 establishes that the government cannot
place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to terminate a non-
viable fetus.6 The Act arguably fails this test. And for this reason,
many commentators believe the Act will be struck down by the
federal courts of appeal and/or the Supreme Court (should it weigh
in).7
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1) (2003).
2. See id. § 1531(c).
3. See, e.g., Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 287 F. Supp. 2d 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
4. See, e.g., id.
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. Id. at 837.
7. See, e.g., Edward Lazarus, The New Anti- "Partial Birth Abortion" Legislation:
Is It a Political Watershed, or Not?, Findlaw's Legal Commentary (Oct. 30. 2002), at
http://writ.news.find law.com/lazarus/20031030.html.
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But what if the federal courts do the unexpected, and uphold the
federal partial-birth abortion law? What happens to those doctors
who have performed partial-birth abortions in the interim between
two points in time-the point when an injunction against the Act's
enforcement was issued, and the point when the Act is upheld by
the last reviewing court?
Assuming no statute of limitations bar, could the Ashcroft Jus-
tice Department prosecute these doctors? Can civil damage reme-
dies be pursued? These are the questions I want to consider in this
short essay.
I. Is IT POSSIBLE THAT THE FEDERAL ACT COULD BE UPHELD
ON THE MERITS?
Most constitutional analysts think the Act is doomed. Indeed,
some consider it "patently unconstitutional" because it suffers
from the same two flaws that led the Supreme Court to invalidate
the State of Nebraska's partial-birth abortion law three years ago,
in Stenberg v. Carhart.8 In particular, detractors urge, the Act does
not provide a narrow and non-vague definition of the prohibited
procedure itself, and the Act does not have an exception that
would permit the procedure to be used when its use would be in
the best interests of the mother's health. 9
I take no position here on whether those who foresee the Act's
ultimate invalidation by federal courts (including the Supreme
Court) are right or wrong; indeed, I have not done enough thinking
on the subject to have any quarrel with their reasoning. But I do
know that the current Supreme Court can sometimes do, and has
in fact done in recent years, many unexpected things in big cases. 10
I also know there is one issue that the United States will raise-
deference to Congressional "fact-finding"-as to which the Court
has been all over the map in recent decades. Defenders of the fed-
eral Act argue that it is different from Nebraska's law in that Con-
gress has made new findings to the effect that the partial-birth
abortion procedure is never medically necessary and indeed is
never safer for the mother than are other procedures. In Con-
gress's words, "substantial evidence.., demonstrates that a partial-
birth abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman
[and] poses significant health risks to the woman upon whom the
8. 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000); see, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 7.
9. See Lazarus, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct 619 (2003); Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-77 (2003).
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procedure is performed and is outside the standard of medical
care."11 Such findings, defenders will urge, must be accepted by
the courts.
In the 1960s, the Court did often seem to defer to Congress's
findings. For example, in the context of racial discrimination in
voting, the Court upheld Congressional power to regulate state
governments based directly upon findings that Congress made
about the existence of racist state policies. 2 But since the mid-
1990s, the Court seems to be much less deferential, or at least
much less consistently deferential. For example, it has held that the
question of whether an activity "substantially affects interstate
commerce" is ultimately one for the Court, and that Congressional
findings on the matter carry relatively little weight. 3
Perhaps one could distinguish the "existence of discrimination"
question from the "substantially affects interstate commerce" ques-
tion on the ground that the former is factual whereas the latter
involves application of a legal standard to facts. But even within
the realm of "factual" questions concerning the presence or ab-
sence of discrimination, the Court has been erratic.
For instance, just last term, in upholding the Family and Medical
Leave Act as a valid exercise of Congress's powers to remedy illicit
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 4 seemed to defer
to Congressional findings that were not much stronger than those
that were rejected in cases over the previous five years, such as
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,15 which
involved similar findings about discrimination in the context of the
Americans With Disabilities Act.16 In short, the Court has been
anything but clear about which questions of fact, or which mixed
questions of fact and law, are those as to which Congress is entitled
to significant respect. And I have no sense of where the "medical
need for partial birth abortions" would fall within the Court's def-
erence matrix.
11. Pub. L. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201 (2003).
12. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337
(1966).
13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614, 627 (2000).
14. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
15. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
16. See Vikram Amar, The New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in Hibbs
(and Guillen), 6 GREENBAG 349 (2003) (discussing the Court's inconsistent treatment
of Congressional findings).
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As to whether deference ought to be given, my own, somewhat
tentative sense, is that while the Court generally should be more
deferential to Congress than it has in the past decade and a half,17
the Court ought not to be very deferential to Congress when Con-
gress is operating in a context where the Court has already indi-
cated that a heightened standard of review is appropriate. In other
words, the Court's level of deference-even on factual matters-
ought to correspond more generally to the "level of scrutiny" the
Court applies in a given setting. Where "intermediate" or "strict"
scrutiny has been adopted by the Court because of skepticism of
legislative power in a given area, that skepticism ought to apply to
legislative factual determinations as well as legal and policy judg-
ments. To my mind, where the Court has gone wrong in recent
times is its effective extension of "heightened scrutiny" to areas
like Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, where a lesser stan-
dard of review (akin to the "minimum rationality review" applied
in McCulloch v. Maryland 8 ) is more defensible. 9 But once the
Court legitimately identifies a classification or activity, the regula-
tion of which ought to trigger suspicions, those suspicions should
apply to fact-finding as well.
In the context of abortion regulation, as I noted above, the Court
has settled on a form of "undue burden" analysis that is effectively
a kind of mid-level scrutiny.2" This standard seems similar, though
not identical, to the mid-level "intermediate scrutiny" often ap-
plied in the equal protection gender classification setting. In that
17. From the years 1995-2000, the Court struck down twenty-four Congressional
enactments. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 84 n.194 (2000) (and sources cited therein). Compare that with the early
period of the Republic. During John Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice, Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed 60 (1803), was the only case clearly calling into ques-
tion the validity of an Act of Congress. The next case in which a Congressional law
was declared unconstitutional by the Court (in dicta no less) was Dred Scott, which
was overruled by the Civil War. The first act of Congress of general applicability to
be held invalid by the Court was the Legal Tender Act in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. 603 (1870). That decision was itself promptly overruled by Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S.
457 (1871). Even taking into account that Congress passes many more laws today
than it did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the attitude of the current
Court is "activist" (defining activism only to mean lack of deference) by any historical
standard.
18. 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
19. See Evan Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Pow-
ers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1157 (2001).
20. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 872 (1984) (arguing that
the level of scrutiny in Casey is reflected throughout "the fundamental rights case
laws of the last forty years.").
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realm, the Court has been somewhat independent in its analysis of
the underlying facts said to justify a sex-based law. 1 In particular,
the Court has focused on the process the legislature used to deter-
mine its facts, and the objective plausibility of the legislature's fac-
tual bottom lines. I would hope the same independent judicial
judgment would apply to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act setting.
But let us suppose, in light of the volatility of the Court's treat-
ment of such matters, that Justice O'Connor 22 finds that the Act is
not as vague as was the Nebraska statute, and that Congress' "find-
ings"-that the partial-birth abortion procedure is never "safe or
safer than" other possible procedures from the standpoint of the
mother's health-are entitled to deference, so that the factual
predicate on which the Court based its Carhart decision no longer
exists. That is, let us suppose that the Court upholds the Act.
The key question for my present purposes then becomes: what
happens to those doctors who have performed partial-birth abor-
tions in violation of the Act during the time a temporary re-
straining order (or other injunction by a lower court) was in effect?
In other words, may these doctors be criminally prosecuted by a
zealous Bush Administration Justice Department for acts violative
of a statute that ultimately gets upheld? Can they be held civilly
responsible?
Remarkably, there may be no straightforward answer to this
question. To appreciate how that can be some, a brief bit of back-
ground is necessary.
21. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (striking down a law which
prohibited beer sales to males under twenty-one years of age and to females under
eighteen years of age, because statutory distinctions by gender are subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection clause, and the goals of public health and safety do not
justify this gender discrimination where the statistics do not "support the conclusion
the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve that objective."); United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1966) (holding that a prestigious military college exclu-
sively for males violated the Equal Protection clause).
22. Justice O'Connor has proven to be the key vote in all the cases that are hard to
predict. She was the only person in the majority of each and every one of the Court's
thirteen 5-4 decisions last year. Some commentators, including John Yoo, have called
her, because of her centrality in modern outcomes on the Court, the most "powerful
woman in American history." See, e.g., Newshour with Jim Lehrer: The Power of One
(PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 2004).
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11. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS, AND "PERMANENT" RELIEF -A
REMEDIES PRIMER
When a statute is passed that prohibits someone's activity, and
that person believes the statute is unconstitutional, he appears to
face a dilemma. He can comply with the statute, but then he gives
up what he believes is a constitutional right to do something. On
the other hand, he can flout the statute, and invoke as a defense in
his prosecution the statute's unconstitutionality. If he prevails on
his constitutional defense, the prosecution will be terminated; un-
constitutionality of the underlying statute is always a complete de-
fense to any prosecution. But-and herein lies the apparent
dilemma-what if he loses on his constitutional defense? Then he
goes to jail. In other words, thus far, the only way he can enjoy the
activity he thinks he has a right to engage in is to risk going to jail if
he turns out not to be a good predictor of constitutional law.
That's where injunctive relief comes in-it is supposed to be a
way around the dilemma. A person can go to court and say: "I am
ready, willing, and anxious to engage in conduct that this statute
purports to prohibit. I would like an order from the court stating
that this statute is unconstitutional, and an injunction against the
prosecutor barring him from enforcing the statute against me."
Oftentimes courts will respond by questioning the "ripeness" of
the plaintiff's constitutional challenge. Do we really know plaintiff
plans to engage in the prohibited conduct? Do we really know that
the statute will be enforced against the plaintiff in any event? But
assuming a person can demonstrate that her case is ripe, she can
seek injunctive relief. The first kind of injunction she is likely to
obtain is a "preliminary injunction" (or its close cousin, the tempo-
rary restraining order). These remedies are injunctions that a court
might issue before it has had time to hold a full-blown trial or simi-
lar proceeding to decide which side is ultimately right about the
statute's constitutionality. Such "preliminary" relief-i.e., relief
pending further proceedings-may be given if a plaintiff can show
that there is some good chance she will ultimately prevail at trial
on the merits, and that she will suffer some serious injury (that
money awarded later cannot undo) in the meantime unless an in-
junction is issued. In doctrinal terms, these two factors are called
the relative "likelihood of success on the merits" of both sides, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
the "balance of hardships" between the parties. Courts considering
preliminary relief must assess them both. 3
That is exactly what happened right after the Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Act was signed into law; various district courts granted prelim-
inary relief-pending a full-blown resolution on the merits-
against the Justice Department, on the ground that the federal Act
may very well be unconstitutional under Carhart, and that women
will suffer in the meanwhile if the law is enforced. For example, the
district court judge in Nebraska who temporarily enjoined the fed-
eral Act observed: "The law challenged here appears to suffer
from a ... vice" similar to the one found in the Nebraska statute in
Carhart, and the "health of women may be harmed if I" do not
issue an injunction.24
All injunctive relief, of course, including preliminary injunctions,
binds only the defendants before the court, and applies only to pro-
tect the specific plaintiffs who have brought the suit. Thus, the Ne-
braska district court injunction to which I just adverted is of no
help to other doctors who are not parties to that very suit. That is
why the plaintiffs in the various lawsuits filed promptly around the
country right after the Act's passage were organizations and as-
sociations of thousands of doctors. These thousands of doctors had
to be included as parties to the cases, or else they would not be
protected by the injunctions that issued.
Nor can the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
be used to protect non-parties from federal government overreach-
ing. Defendants other than the federal government are often es-
topped, or precluded, from relitigating a particular legal or factual
question against a new opponent when they have already lost
against a prior opponent on the same legal or factual question. The
reason courts permit this offensive non-mutual issue preclusion is
that the defendant had his day in court on the issue in an earlier
case, and should be stuck with the result.2 5 But the Supreme Court
has held that the federal government is not subject to this non-
mutual issue preclusion doctrine, because the federal government
is involved in so much litigation, and to bind it to a loss on an issue
23. See, e.g., Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2003) (stating courts eval-
uate requests for stay by measuring "an applicant's likelihood of success on the merits
and to take account of the equity interests involved."); Los Angeles Mem'l Comm'n
v. Nat'l Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1986) (in considering pre-
liminary relief, the court assessed both the likelihood of success on the merits and the
balance of hardships between the parties).
24. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1016 (D. Neb. 2003).
25. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
2004] 663
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
in any one case would "freeze" into law results that may need to be
revisited.26
By contrast, once a law is struck down on the merits as unconsti-
tutional on its face by the Supreme Court, such a ruling will pro-
hibit enforcement against anyone-not just the parties in the
Supreme Court case-because the Supreme Court's facial invalida-
tion of the statute would bind all judges in the land. Prosecutors
who tried to enforce the statute would not be violating an injunc-
tion, but they would be wasting everyone's time (arguably in viola-
tion of due process), unless there was a reason to believe the
Supreme Court had changed its mind.27
If a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act is followed up by a permanent injunc-
tion entered after the district court holds the statute invalid on the
merits, and that injunction is in turn affirmed by a U.S. Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court (as may happen in the case
of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act), things are relatively
simple.
But what happens if a preliminary injunction is not followed by
an invalidation of the statute. That is, what if the district court after
hearing all the evidence decides the law is constitutional after all?
Or what if a district court's permanent injunction is reversed by the
Court of Appeals? Or what if the Supreme Court upholds the stat-
ute when the case gets up there? What then?
If any of these things were to happen in the federal, Partial-Birth
Abortion Act setting, matters might get complicated. It is clear that
after such reversals of course, doctors could no longer rely on the
relief granted them earlier in the case. That is, doctors clearly could
be held responsible for any partial-birth abortion they performed
after a higher decision upholding the Act came down. But what
about conduct that was performed while the injunction was in ef-
fect? Are doctors immunized for acts disobedient to the statute un-
dertaken while the injunction preventing enforcement was in
effect?
26. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163 (1984).
27. Note, in this regard, the difference between precedent and preclusion. Prece-
dent binds non-parties, but can be revisited and overruled by the appellate courts. By
contrast, preclusion, where it applies, forecloses a court from reexamining at all the
issue(s) as to which preclusion operates. For that reason, applying non-mutual estop-
pel against the federal government is thought to be a much more problematic than are
the constraints reflected by the doctrine of stare decisis.
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A. The Edgar v. MITE Decision
The Supreme Court has never really made up its mind on any of
this. It has been twenty years since members of the Supreme Court
really engaged these questions at all. Of the three Justices who
took up the issue in some detail two decades ago, only Justice John
Paul Stevens remains on the Court today.
The question arose in the 1982, Edgar v. MITE Corp. case,28
which involved an Illinois statute that tried to regulate corporate
takeover offers. MITE Corp. challenged the constitutionality of the
Illinois statute on the ground that the statute unduly burdened in-
terstate commerce, and was preempted by federal law.
On February 2, 1979, MITE obtained a preliminary injunction
from a federal district court restraining the Illinois Secretary of
State from invoking the provisions of the Illinois statute to block
MITE's intended takeover of another company.29 On February 5,
in violation of the provisions of the Illinois law, MITE published its
takeover offer in the Wall Street Journal.30
On February 9, the district court entered a judgment declaring
the Illinois statute unconstitutional; the court then permanently en-
joined the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois statute against
MITE.31 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling, and thus the injunction against
enforcement remained intact.32 The Illinois Secretary of State,
however, sought review of the constitutionality of the statute in the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court granted review.33 Some mem-
bers of the Court addressed the immunity provided by preliminary
injunctions within a larger debate about whether the case was
moot. If the case were moot when it reached the Supreme Court,
dismissal of the case would have been required.
Justice Stevens wrote separately, stressing that, in his view, the
case would be moot unless Illinois might still prosecute MITE for
conduct undertaken while the preliminary injunction was in effect.
Because Justice Stevens thought such prosecution would be per-
missible, there was to his mind still a live case or controversy for
the Court to review:
28. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
29. Id. at 629.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 630.
33. Id.; see Edgar v. Mite Corp., 451 U.S. 968 (1981) (the Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction).
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If ... the injunction granted the MITE Corp. a complete immu-
nity from state sanctions for any acts performed while the in-
junction was outstanding, I would [conclude] that the case is
moot. On the other hand, if the injunction did no more than it
purported to do, setting aside the injunction would remove its
protection and MITE would be subject to sanctions in the state
courts. Those courts might regard the fact that an injunction
was outstanding at the time MITE violated the Illinois statute as
a defense to any enforcement proceeding, but unless the federal
injunction was tantamount to a grant of immunity, there is no
federal rule of law that would require the state courts to absolve
MITE from liability.34
Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Brennan,
strongly disagreed. They argued that the case was in fact moot be-
cause there was no longer a takeover offer on the table and a fed-
eral court injunction-even a preliminary injunction-ought to be
understood as conferring complete immunity for acts undertaken
while the injunction was in effect.35
Justice Marshall's approach would give federal judges the power
to grant complete immunity from punitive sanctions to persons
who desire to test the constitutionality of a state statute: "[F]ederal
courts . . . have the power to issue a preliminary injunction that
offers permanent protection from penalties for violations of the
statute that occurred during the period the injunction was in effect.
Determining whether a particular injunction provides temporary or
permanent protection becomes a question of interpretation. ' 36
Justice Stevens rejected the premise underlying Justice Mar-
shall's approach, contending that, regardless of the wisdom of this
rule, "federal judges have no power to grant such blanket dispensa-
tion from the requirements of valid legislative enactments. '37
1. The Problem with Justice Stevens's Position: How Far Does
Its Logic Go?
Several aspects of Justice Stevens's position are not entirely
clear. As I will explain, pushing Stevens's reasoning to its logical
endpoint seems quite scary. Yet Justice Stevens does not clearly
identify where the stopping point in his argument would be, and
34. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 647. It may be surprising today that Justice Stevens ex-
pressed this view, inasmuch as he is thought as one of the most "liberal" members of
the current Court.
35. See id. at 655-64.
36. Id. at 656-57.
37. Id. at 649.
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why. First, Justice Stevens says, at various points, federal courts
lack the power to block prosecution of a state statute found to be
valid.38 Is his view inspired only by federalism worries, or-as
some of his broader language and most of his logic suggests-in
Justice Stevens's view, do federal courts also lack the power to
block prosecutions under a federal statute?
Second, Justice Stevens does not limit his argument to prelimi-
nary injunctions, which means that it might also apply to perma-
nent injunctions and declarations of unconstitutionality issued by
the district court. Stevens bluntly opines that a federal declaration
of unconstitutionality "reflects [no more than] the opinion of the
federal court that the statute cannot be enforced. ' 39 As a result,
Justice Stevens would at some level leave the plaintiffs in a Catch-
22: Give up an activity that they believe (and a district court
agrees) is constitutionally protected, or risk criminal prosecution
down the road if the district court is reversed.
This Catch-22 would continue until the Supreme Court deci-
sively affirmed the issuance of the injunction (or denied review)-
and indeed, might even continue through the entire statute of limi-
tations period! After all, what if the Court overruled its own prece-
dent and later held the statute constitutional? Under a very broad
reading of Justice Stevens's logic, perhaps backward-looking prose-
cutions could be brought even then.
2. The Problem with Justice Marshall's Position: Where Do
Courts Get The Power?
On the other hand, Justice Marshall never really answers Justice
Stevens's complaint: Where do federal courts get the power in the
first place to immunize illegal conduct under a statute that is even-
tually validated?
With respect to federal enactments like the Partial Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act, Congress could undoubtedly give the federal courts
the power to immunize persons for criminal and civil liability under
the Act for conduct committed during the time any federal court
injunction were in effect. The source of Congress's power to do so
would be the same source (whatever that may be) that gives Con-
gress the power to create the underlying civil or criminal liability
under the Act in the first place. In this setting, the greater power
to regulate a given activity subsumes the lesser power to immunize
38. See id. at 648.
39. Id. at 650 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1974)).
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some subset of that activity from regulation. Congress could au-
thorize federal courts to provide this immunity simply by creating
an affirmative defense under the Act for conduct undertaken in
reasonable reliance on a judicial injunction in a case in which the
person was a party. This is essentially the position adopted by the
Model Penal Code, which has been embraced by many states (but
not Illinois, the state at issue in Edgar v. MITE) with respect to
immunity for state law violations.40
Whether Congress could authorize federal courts to provide im-
munity from liability under state statutes during the time while fed-
eral injunctions are in force-the precise question in MITE-is a
more complicated question. I would argue that Congress does in-
deed have that power, under its authority to establish a federal ju-
diciary, and to provide those federal courts the jurisdiction to hear
federal question cases. In other words, Congress's power under
Article I, section 8, to pass all laws necessary and proper 41 to facili-
tate the Article III power given to the federal judiciary to hear
cases "arising under this Constitution"42 allows Congress to facili-
tate access to the federal judiciary for people who challenge state
laws as violative of the federal Constitution. And although some
people may raise federal, constitutional challenges to state laws in
the absence of immunity, many more will do so if the immunity is
provided.
The reality is that many people cannot wait months or years to
vindicate what they believe to be their constitutional rights. Yet
waiting for a final Supreme Court ruling (or denial of review) in a
particular case will typically take months or years. If plaintiffs
must wait that long to rely on a ruling-and perform the acts they
have wanted to perform all along-then they may not bother to
bring their cases in the first place. Instead, they may simply forgo
their desires, and perhaps their rights, and forget about challenging
the statute altogether. Concomitantly, changes of circumstances
may also sap their resolve, by technically mooting their cases.
On the other hand, the provision of federal court immunity will
certainly increase the number of federal claims raised in the federal
courts. And for Congress to enjoy valid constitutional authority to
provide immunity, thereby effectively temporarily displacing or
preempting state law that may ultimately be upheld as constitu-
tional in the federal courts, Congress's grant of immunity need not
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (1962).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1.
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be absolutely necessary to the goal of facilitating access to federal
courts for federal claimants, but rather only need be helpful or con-
ducive to that goal.43
The Supreme Court recently validated this line of reasoning in
an analogous setting. To facilitate the bringing of federal claims in
federal courts, Congress provided under 28 U.S.C. section 1367 for
so-called "supplemental" jurisdiction by the federal courts over
state law claims arising out of the same case or controversy as the
federal claims. 44 Because some such state law claims would ulti-
mately be remanded by the federal courts to the state courts, and
because some plaintiffs might be deterred from bringing their fed-
eral and state law claims in federal court by the fear that the statute
of limitations might expire on their state law claims by the time
those claims are remanded to state court, Congress enacted section
1367(d). It provides that the state statute of limitations should be
tolled during the time a supplemental state law claim is pending in
federal court.45 Congress's power to do so-to effectively preempt
the states' statutes of limitation-was challenged, and ultimately
upheld last Term in Jinks v. Richland County.4 6
In affirming Congress's power to displace state law in order to
facilitate access of federal claims into federal court, the Court
observed:
[Section] 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into exe-
cution Congress's power 'to constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court,' and to assure that those tribunals may fairly
and efficiently exercise '[t]he judicial Power of the United
States. As to 'necessity': The federal courts can assuredly exist
and function in the absence of § 1367(d), but we long ago re-
jected the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands
that an Act of Congress be 'absolutely necessary' to the exercise
of an enumerated power. Rather, it suffices that § 1367(d) is
'conducive to the due administration of justice in federal
court ... because ... it eliminates a serious impediment to ac-
cess to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing fed-
47eral claims ....
But in the context of injunctions that are later vacated-my sub-
ject today-Congress has not enacted any such law to provide im-
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 355-57 (1818) (interpreting the neces-
sary and proper clause as not requiring strict mathematical necessity).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
45. § 1367(d).
46. 538 U.S. 456, 123 S. Ct. 1667 (2003).
47. Id. at 1671 (citations omitted).
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munity, with respect to either federal or state law liability. So
where do federal courts get the power to confer this immunity, if
not from Congress? If the power comes from anywhere, it must
come directly from the Constitution.
IH. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES FOR FEDERAL
COURTS' POWER TO IMMUNIZE
One possibility is that federal courts themselves have the power
to facilitate access to the federal courts for federal claimants,
whether or not this access is explicitly authorized by Congress.
This suggestion is undermined by the commonly accepted wisdom
that Congress need not vest federal courts with anything close to
the full extent of what Article III allows. Ordinarily, as courts of
limited jurisdiction, federal courts must scrupulously respect Con-
gressional as well as constitutional limits on their jurisdiction.48
On the other hand, there are at least some examples of the Su-
preme Court fashioning doctrine on its own, in seeming tension
with ostensibly constitutional limitations, in order to promote ac-
cess of federal claimants to federal courts. Perhaps the most prom-
inent example is the so-called "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception to mootness. 49 Under this exception, a case that
the Court considers technically moot will nonetheless be heard if
such review is the only way that the plaintiff's federal question can
ever be addressed by the court.5" Another example of federal
courts attempting to expand their jurisdiction to facilitate access is
the so-called "jurisdiction by necessity" exception to personal juris-
dictional requirements, alluded to by the Supreme Court in Shaffer
v. Heitner.51
48. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (requiring a minimum amount-in-controversy
for district courts to have original jurisdiction over a civil action); Louisville & N.R.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (requiring a "well-pleaded" complaint for
district courts to have jurisdiction).
49. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); cf. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 319 (1974) (rejecting the exception to mootness where the issues raised will
not "in the future evade review.").
50. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
("The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have
standing, is not a reason to find standing."); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. Rv. 605, 612-14 (1992) (not-
ing that perhaps the mootness exception simply proves that mootness is not a consti-
tutional doctrine).
51. 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). Note, however, that this exception has never
been formally used by the Supreme Court to hear a case. Note also that this "excep-
tion" and the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception, applies only when
federal court access would otherwise be completely impossible, not merely-as in the
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
Moreover, another possible constitutional source for the power
for federal courts to fashion immunity on their own is the Due Pro-
cess idea embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Due
process means, among other things, that one cannot be prosecuted
unless she has been provided adequate notice that her actions are
criminal. A contrary judicial ruling upon which one relied could
undermine any argument that she did not, in fact, receive proper
notice.
The Supreme Court has seemed sensitive to this concern when it
has reversed its own earlier position on a particular act's criminal-
ity. In cases such as James v. United States,52 it has held that Due
Process means that the federal government cannot punish someone
for the commission of an act that the Court had earlier held, in
other cases, to be non-criminal under the statute in question. 3
One could imagine applying this logic to say that when a defen-
dant has obtained a permanent injunction against enforcement of a
statute, she cannot be punished for violating that statute. Indeed,
reliance on a permanent injunction that you yourself obtained may
be thought to be more reasonable than reliance on an early case
involving other parties. Whereas, reliance on a preliminary injunc-
tion is much trickier, since the injunction itself does not make any
final determination of constitutionality-finding at most only a
"likelihood" of success on the merits.
But James and similar precedents could also be limited, on sev-
eral grounds, to exclude their application to lower federal court
injunctions. First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court,
while allowing reliance on its own rulings, has been loath to allow
reliance on lower federal court rulings as to the scope of a federal
criminal law, especially when lower courts are themselves
divided.54
Second, it may be worth mentioning that the James line of cases
dealt with judicial determinations of the meaning of federal crimi-
nal statutes, not their constitutionality.55 That might make a differ-
ence when it comes to notice. Someone who acts believing that her
behavior is not criminal under a given statute in the first place is
context of injunctive immunity-simply made more difficult. See Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n. 13 (1984).
52. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
53. Id. at 222.
54. See United States v. Rogers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984). I should note that some
commentators, such as Trevor Morrison, have criticized the Court's failure to extend
the James principle to protect reliance on some lower court rulings.
55. See James, 366 U.S. at 222.
20041
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
arguably more innocent than someone who knowingly violates a
statute because she feels it is unconstitutional. Put another way,
some people may argue (although I do not know that I would be
among them) that uncertainty (or lack of notice) about a law's va-
lidity may be different than uncertainty (or lack of notice) about a
law's coverage.
If a statute gives fair warning that conduct is criminal, that may,
in the Court's eyes, be enough to render such conduct
prosecutable-even if the statute is enjoined for some time by
lower courts. In Lanier v. United States,56 for example, the Court
used language suggesting that it might take this view, finding a due
process problem only when someone is prosecuted for "conduct
that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly dis-
closed to be within its scope."57 The Court, in other words, may
decide that statutory warning is always fair warning.
IV. PUNITIVE LIABILITY V. COMPENSATORY LIABILITY
Even if one concluded that federal courts had the power, under
either of the theories suggested above, to confer immunity on their
own from criminal liability for violations of a law while an injunc-
tion was in effect, it is unclear that such immunity would or could
extend to compensatory liability. For example, in Edgar v. MITE,
even Justice Marshall, who argued most broadly in favor of a pre-
sumption of immunity, noted that the government might, if the law
that was violated while an injunction was in effect was ultimately
upheld as a valid law, seek to obtain non-criminal relief:
I believe that injunctions should ordinarily be interpreted only
as providing permanent protection from penalties. The state
should be barred from penalizing the offeror for acts that took
place during the period the injunction was in effect. However, if
a court determines the state statute is valid, the State should be
free to provide a remedy for the continuing effects of acts that
violated the statute. In particular, a State should be permitted
to dismantle a successful acquisition that violated a valid
statute.58
Perhaps Justice Marshall was a bit careless in this passage, and
what he meant was simply that a wrongdoer should not continue to
benefit by his wrongdoing-that restitutionary principles require
that a wrongdoer disgorge any ill-gotten gains. But Justice Mar-
56. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
57. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
58. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 661 n.10 (1982).
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shall did not say that immunity should not cover restitutionary
remedies; he said that immunity should be limited to "penalties."59
Are civil compensatory damages a "penalty" under this ap-
proach? For instance, what are we to make of the cause of action
that the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act creates for fathers and
husbands against doctors who perform the procedures? 6° Are
these non-penal since they are compensatory (in theory)? Or are
they "penalties" because they take away from the doctors more
than the doctors obtained for performing the illegal acts? This is
another set of questions that need attention.
These issues the Supreme Court and Congress have so far left
open-of whether a federal court injunction can be relied upon to
confer immunity from prosecution, and if so what kind of immu-
nity-ought to be resolved, one way or the other, so that litigants
know where they stand.
Granted, it may well be that the federal and state prosecutors
are unlikely to "reach back" and prosecute persons who acted at a
time an injunction was in effect. But, on the other hand, some pros-
ecutors might well be tempted to do so, especially when it comes to
politically charged matters like so-called partial-birth abortion.
As the impeachment of Bill Clinton, the contested Presidential
election of 2000, and the California gubernatorial recall illustrate,
we have a tendency not to look at unresolved areas of law until a
political crisis forces us to. But that has proven to be a great mis-
take. For these reasons, Congress and the federal judiciary should
clarify things so that people can know how much-or how little-
injunctive relief is really worth, in the Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act setting, and beyond.
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (2003).
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